5 A fact explicitly acknowledged by national leaders, especially when justifying a use of force and framing it as being in defence of the nation, eg Prime Minister David Cameron speaking to the House of Commons, 'My first duty as a Prime Minister is to keep the British people safe.' HC Deb 7 September 2015, col 27 <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150907/debtext/150907-0001.htm> accessed 13 April 2016; UK Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon MP in his oral evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights asserting that preventing loss of life is the 'primary duty of government', Joint Committee on Human Rights, Oral Evidence: The UK Government's Policy on Use of Drones for Targeted Killing (HC 2015-16, 574) 7 <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/human-rightscommittee/the-uk-governments-policy-on-the-use-of-drones-for-targeted-killing/oral/27633.pdf> accessed 13 April 2016. 6 The endemic global violence unleashed after 9/11 in 2001 has generated numerous explanations under the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but increasingly also by a 'meta' concept of 'self-defence' that has hitherto largely been confined to the jus ad bellum, and now seems to have been unchained from its shackles in Article 51 of the UN Charter to become the overriding norm. Its apparent transformation from a right that justified the defence of one state from an attack by another, to an overweening inherent exercise of sovereign duty to protect all aspects of a state (its territory, its government and its population, even its way of life 11 ) has had 11 See, eg the statement by President Hollande following the terrorist attacks Paris on 13 November 2015 declaring that the attacks were 'committed by a terrorist army, the Islamic State group, a jihadist army, against France, against the values we defend everywhere in the world, against what we are: a free country that means something to the whole planet… What we are defending is our country, but more than that, it is our values'. L Dearden, 'Paris terror attack: Francois Hollande vows merciless response to Isis "barbarity"' The Independent (London, 14 November 2015).
philosophers have connected the nature of the state with self-defence. John Locke viewed protection as being the core justification for the state's monopoly on the use of force. In order to preserve their wealth, life, liberty and general well-being, men united together to form states and made a pact (the social contract) with government that it would have coercive power, in exchange for protection. It follows that, if the government becomes unable to protect the people against threats, the people are justified in throwing over the government as the pact has been broken -the people have returned to the state of nature. To legitimately evoke the right to self-defence, a state is required to demonstrate that it has suffered an intentional armed attack. 22 Traditionally, this was understood as being an attack on the territory or flagged ship of a state. In the modern era, it is not necessarily so straightforward to determine when an armed attack has begun and so when it is legitimate to utilise armed force in self-defence. In the aftermath of 9/11, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1368
and made explicit reference to 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter'. Resolution 1373 reaffirmed this statement and, utilising Chapter VII powers, adopted a series of binding decisions, which included an instruction for all states to 'take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist attacks'. These resolutions designated terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and recognised or, indeed, helped to create conditions in which states would be able to exercise their inherent right to selfdefence in response to terrorism or even the threat of terrorism. Thus, in this age of terrorism,
NSAs are deemed capable of mounting an armed attack that justifies and legitimises the use of force in self-defence. This developing of the principle of self-defence in extremis, without providing criteria for determining whether an act by an NSA is an 'armed attack' (and so a threat to international peace and security) and without thought to the consequences, has arguably undermined the prohibition on the use of armed force as now states are able to designate a fellow state or an NSA as terrorist and thereby justify the use of force by citing self-defence. For example, in response to the 2015 Paris shootings, France embarked upon an aerial bombing campaign against ISIL in Syria, citing self-defence, despite the lack of credible evidence that the shootings were carried out by ISIL operatives and/or explicitly co-ordinated and directed by the group and so actually attributable to them. 23 It appears that it is enough for an act of violence to be 'inspired by' ISIL for it to justify the use of force in self-defence. Thus, it appears that merely the existence of ISIL and its ideology poses a threat to international peace and security and so engages the inherent right to self-defence (and self-preservation -the Western states are arguably fighting to maintain the status quo and to preserve their existence as it is now): 'They have inspired the worst terrorist attack against British people since 7/7 on the beaches of Tunisia, and they have plotted atrocities on the streets here at home. Since November last year our security services have foiled no fewer than seven different
III. Drone Technology and Legal Change
With the odd exception, such as the regulation of outer space, 25 international law tends to develop as a reaction to change. In this way it might be anticipated that new non-kinetic technologies that can be used to disable computer networks, or to carry mass covert surveillance of e-mail traffic, may take decades to bring within a clear legal framework, depending on how quickly states come to realise that it is in their mutual self-interest to effectively regulate cyber-space. It may, in any case, prove to be an impossible task as it raises the question of whether states can actually regulate something that has escaped the confines of sovereignty -it may simply be too late to put the genie back into the bottle. In this scenario, states will fall back on general principles of international law, such as the norm prohibiting intervention in a state's political or economic affairs, which will not prevent cyber operations but will enable selective condemnation in the General Assembly and, occasionally, executive responses to particular threats by the Security Council.
In contrast, when it comes to new technologies that seem to provide straightforward improvements in military efficacy, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, it should be expected that existing international law will be adequate. Indeed, this is quite commonly the argument made in the literature, given that drones are seen as mere 'platforms' for the launch of weapons such as missiles and not new weapons per se.
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Furthermore, drones are portrayed by their users and supporters as upholding the value of security rather than undermining it. 27 Drone using states, in particular, argue that new law is unnecessary for the regulation of drones, since they are simply another means of delivering death and destruction. But such arguments belie the fact that existing laws have to be reinterpreted and applied to drones and that in this process the louder voices of the drone using state tends to dominate. Such debate is not confined to the rules of humanitarian law on plots against our people, so this threat is very real… do we go after these terrorists in their heartlands, from where they are plotting to kill British people, or do we sit back and wait for them to attack us?' HC Deb Given that the drones themselves are not entitled to the right of self-defence since their operators are not under imminent threat of attack, and the targets are a distance away from the state using them, the dynamics of self-defence action though the use of drones are clearly different.
The increasing use of drones raises security concerns for a number of reasons. When they are used for surveillance they are potential threats to personal security and privacy. When used for targeting purposes they not only raise security concerns for civilians potentially caught in the blast (the problem of collateral losses), but they also seem to either extend the battlefield, thereby bringing the instability inherent in war, or constitute the extraterritorial application of force for the purposes of some extreme form of law enforcement. Under this model of law enforcement, capture, arrest and trial are replaced by summary execution. All of these conceptions of drone use challenge the notion that they represent a new era of clean, clinical and, above all, legitimate use of force. Perceptions and assertions of security by governments are difficult for the courts to resist, particularly in times of terrorism that are characterised by random attacks against civilians, even when government actions to protect the lives and security of its citizens may appear to tread on the very freedoms it is fighting to protect.
Governments are under a duty to provide their citizens with security, but it cannot be an absolute duty -one that it aims to achieve at all costs. Due diligence obligations upon governments are obligations of conduct, 29 rather than result, and so a failure by government to prevent specific acts of terrorism is not necessarily an indication that the state has failed to fulfil its duties to protect life and security. Applying this jurisprudence by analogy to terrorist attacks creates some challenges: the bombing of civilians on aircraft or commuter trains and the hijacking of aircraft suggests a random choice of victims, rather than the selection of an 'identified individual or individuals' as victims.
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When drones are used outside of a state's jurisdiction, whether for surveillance or for targeting purposes, and when lethal force is used against individuals, the human rights issues become more complex. While human rights obligations apply to individuals within a state's territory, there is considerable debate about when they apply to individuals outside its territory but, arguably, within its jurisdiction. 34 When considering the use of armed force from a drone against a terrorist suspect, the question is whether the individual is within the jurisdiction of the state using force. Although there is some Inter-American case-law that supports the application of the right to life in these circumstances, 35 there is contrary European jurisprudence. 36 Rather than considering whether the state using force has enough control over the targeted individual for the purposes of evaluating whether there is an assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances, it might be better for the Courts to focus on the fact that the operator of the drone, often a distance away from the target, is clearly under the control of the state using force. under the jus ad bellum. The confusion of legal concepts is a deliberate manipulation of the law to justify drones, which are used to hunt down their targets rather than respond to imminent attacks.
It seems that after the devastating attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, governments (and not just the US) have re-assessed their security priorities, have reasserted national security (often on the basis that this is the best way to protect human security) and have acted in violation of basic norms governing when coercion can be used by the state against individuals in order to protect the majority of its citizens. This has either been as a result of the extension of the battlefield or the extension of law enforcement. While the majority of states may support this, or, more accurately, remain supine in the face of these erosions, the securitisation of post-9/11 life has meant that (the right to) security has been elevated to a pre-eminent position in political rhetoric and action in contradistinction to its position as one of a number of human rights and protections provided by international law. 44 Thus, while there are international norms applicable to drone use, a great deal of it is underdeveloped, indeterminate or ineffectual, and furthermore, has been subject to artful manipulation of the boundaries between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, with little regard to the right to life of the target. The UN itself has not tackled the legality of drone usage in any meaningful way. Although this is probably to be expected in the executive body, it is disappointing to see that the plenary body has also failed to fulfil its functions as a security community with the ability to shape normative frameworks, confining itself instead to exhortation in general resolutions to the effect that counter-terrorism efforts by states should be undertaken in conformity with international human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 45 This simply begs the question of how these norms should be applied to drone strikes.
IV. The Killing of an Individual in Self-Defence of a State
Given the discussion above, it seems that technology may have outstripped the law, for drones are not just new platforms for delivering weapons, they actually change the dynamics of both the battlefield and of law enforcement outside the battlefield. The Prime Minister provided no more detail on these alleged plots -not even an indication of the stage at which the plots were stopped or the nature of the attempted attacks. There is also no indication as to whether or not the plots were such that those involved faced (successful)
criminal prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation, or whether the security services relied on more conventional criminal law provisions. The lack of detailed information is interesting as it allows the Prime Minister to build an image of a country under siege from terrorist attacks, without being restricted by or bogged-down in the details. He continued:
The threat picture facing Britain in terms of Islamist extremist violence is more acute today than ever before. In stepping up our response to meet this threat, we have developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that seeks to prevent and disrupt plots against this country at every stage. It includes new powers to stop suspects travelling. It includes powers to enable our police and security services to apply for stronger locational constraints on those in the UK who pose a risk. It addresses the root cause of the threat-the poisonous ideology of Islamist extremism-by taking on all forms of extremism, not just violent extremism.
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Here Mr Cameron continues in the construction of a UK facing an unprecedented threat (it has never before been as acute), which requires an even stronger response, by explaining a counterterrorist strategy that ultimately requires the extinction of threats at their source. For something to be considered 'extreme', there must be a mainstream against which it can be measured -extremism is now used to label views and opinions as 'bad' in an apparent attempt to create an objective standard to which all must adhere. The Prime Minister continued by outlining the UK government's response to the threat:
We have pursued Islamist terrorists through the courts and the criminal justice system.
Since 2010, more than 800 people have been arrested and 140 successfully prosecuted. Our approach includes acting overseas to tackle the threat at source, with British aircraft delivering nearly 300 air strikes over Iraq. Our airborne intelligence and surveillance assets have assisted our coalition partners with their operations over Syria. As part of this counterterrorism strategy, as I have said before, if there is a direct threat to the British people and we are able to stop it by taking immediate action, then, as Prime Minister, I will always be prepared to take that action. That is the case whether the threat is emanating from Libya, from Syria or from anywhere else.
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The Prime Minister then turned to the targeted drone strike in question, explaining it as a precise use of lethal force taken under the UK inherent right to self-defence in order to eliminate the threat caused by the terrorist activities of the targeted individual:
In recent weeks it has been reported that two ISIL fighters of British nationality, who had been plotting attacks against the UK and other countries, have been killed in air strikes. self-defence with the concept of punishment and promotes the concept that some states are in a position to discipline individuals in other states. However, the 'purpose of a defensive act is not to inflict harm according to the desert of the aggressor; its purpose is to repeal the attack'. 60 Thus, self-defence needs to be just that -the defence of the self.
B. Killing an Individual as an Act of Self-Defence of the UK The Prime Minister relayed to the House the circumstances of Reyaad Khan's death:
Today, I can inform the House that in an act of self-defence and after meticulous planning, Reyaad Khan was killed in a precision airstrike carried out on 21 August by an RAF remotely piloted aircraft while he was travelling in a vehicle in the area of Raqqa in Syria.
In addition to Reyaad Khan, who was the target of the strike, two ISIL associates were also killed, one of whom, Ruhul Amin, has been identified as a UK national. They were ISIL fighters, and I can confirm that there were no civilian casualties.
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In this statement Mr Cameron unequivocally asserts that the UK was acting in self-defence.
For a state to be able to assert its inherent right to self-defence under the jus ad bellum against Reyaad Khan, there needs to be an 'armed attack'. 62 In the to life. The human rights standard is applicable to state agents when they use force to defend themselves or others, or to prevent a serious crime from being committed.
i. In criminal law
In UK domestic law, self-defence is the use of reasonable force in defence of the self, another person, or property. Imminence of threat is a necessary element. 68 UK domestic criminal law generally does not apply extraterritorially, although for certain serious crimes it does -those offences include murder and manslaughter.
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ii. In human rights law
The UK did not have control or authority over the area in which Khan resided. According to the European Court of Human Rights, for human rights to have extra-territorial application, the state in question must be exercising control and authority over the relevant individual and/or the territory in which they are in. 70 As the UK was not involved in military action in Syria at that time, this was prima facia not the case and so the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would not appear to apply. If the ECHR were held to apply, on the basis either that the use of force against an individual should be construed as an assertion of jurisdiction by the UK, and/or that the drone operator situated in the UK should trigger jurisdiction as he or she is clearly under the control (and is within the territory) of the UK, article 2(2) ECHR permits killing in defence of others where absolutely necessary to protect life, which is one way of appraising the UK government's claim to self-defence in this case, although it presented no evidence that the lives of specific individuals in the UK or elsewhere were under imminent threat of existential attack.
iii. In international law
States have a right to self-defence that pre-dates the UN Charter. In the Nicaragua case the International Court established that the right to self-defence was an 'inherent' right under customary international law that was 'confirmed and influenced by' the UN Charter. considering violence between individuals, the legitimacy of pre-emption is understandable as an individual faces possible extinction from an attack, especially one involving a weapon. A state does not face the same degree of threat in that it is hard to see how one individual can sufficiently threaten a state with extinction. However, to allow terrorist threats to materialise would potentially undermine the social contract between state and its citizens as the monopoly on force the state enjoys is quid pro quo for the security each citizen enjoys. This would only occur, however, if the level of terrorist force was allowed to be such as to have the 'scale and effects' spoken about in the Nicaragua case. 99 Below that threshold, terrorist violence should be dealt with in a the same manner as the serious threat of violent crime arising within the UK from organised crime, drug-related crime, vigilantism, and other similar challenges to the state monopoly on force.
D. An Additional Criterion
In continuing his speech to the House, the Prime Minister appeared to add another criterion to the assessment of when the use of force in self-defence is legitimate:
We took this action because there was no alternative. In this area, there is no Government we can work with; we have no military on the ground to detain those preparing plots; and there was nothing to suggest that Reyaad Khan would ever leave Syria or desist from his desire to murder us at home, so we had no way of preventing his planned attacks on our country without taking direct action.
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The UK appears to be adding an additional criterion of 'unable or unwilling', on the part of the host state where the terrorists are found, to the assessment of when the use of self-defence is legitimate. This is a problematic additional criterion as it is not clear how that is to be assessed and who is qualified to make that determination. 101 It is not clear where this criterion has come from in relation to self-defence and appears to be a mixing of different legal principles 99 Nicaragua (n 63).
also framing the conduct of the operation, but the overriding claim was that the government had no other choice but to use lethal force in defence of the UK. do. There was a terrorist directing murder on our streets and no other means to stop him.
The Government do not for one minute take these decisions lightly, but I am not prepared to stand here in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on our streets and have to explain to the House why I did not take the chance to prevent it when I could have done. That is why I believe our approach is right. I commend this statement to the House. The government has declined to publish the Attorney-General's advice and it is not exactly clear whether or not the advice was specific to the killing of Khan or was more in principle.
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In response to a question from Harriet Harman MP, the Prime Minister stated:
She asked: is this the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used to conduct a strike in a country where we are not involved in a war? The answer to that is yes. Of course, Britain has used remotely piloted aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this is a new departure, and that is why I thought it was important to come to the House and explain why The use of the self-defence argument is predicated on the notion that it is possible to determine which actor has behaved illegitimately and in a manner that makes the use of force against them justifiable. The most relevant question was not answered; instead the government fell back on arguments of humanitarian law that only apply in an armed conflict to which the UK is a party. The introduction of in bello standards to displace the stricter human rights ones is yet another example of the government playing fast and loose with international law.
V Conclusion
There will be drone strikes in the future where there is no link to an armed conflict, where the standard against which the action should be measured is one of self-defence and then care must be taken to assess whether the claim can be founded under the UN Charter, essentially as a defence of state, or under human rights law, as a defence of individuals. Self-defence at both levels shares common features, such as imminence, that drone strikes like the one against Reyaad Khan, struggle to match, but killing individuals in defence of individuals is properly assessed at the more precise level of the right to life. The fact that human rights law has lagged behind the technology reality of drone strikes, by failing to recognise whether the use of lethal force against an individual by a state agent firing a weapon from a drone flying over another state is an assertion of jurisdiction over the target, should not detract from the conclusion that the targeted killing of an individual is an act that should be judged by human rights standards.
There are two exceptions to this: first, if the targeted individual can be said to be part of an imminent armed attack on the UK that has such scale and effects that it triggers the right of self-defence of the state itself under Article 51 of the Charter, when proportionate force can be used to eliminate the attack or imminent threat of it; secondly, where the UK is engaged in an on-going armed conflict against a non-state actor such as ISIL, and the individual is a legitimate target under the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law). It is submitted that Reyaad Khan's killing did not fit either of the exceptions and, moreover, on the evidence presented by the Prime Minister, did not represent such an existential threat to individuals within the UK to justify the use of lethal force against him in violation of his right to life.
New technology, whereby an operator, sitting thousands of miles away, can in real time and with great precision kill an individual, means that individual drone strikes outside of an armed conflict challenge our conceptions of when force is legally justifiable. The surgical killing of an individual by a drone operator who is not under imminent threat of existential violence or physically close to others who are under such a threat, does not seem to fit our definition of self-defence as either captured in criminal law or human rights law, but it is argued that it should be these standards that are applicable. Evidence of an existential imminent threat to individuals in the UK or to its citizens abroad must be given for such strikes to be justified.
Claiming the right to defend the state by targeted killings of individuals cannot be accepted per se without evidence that the individual was part of an imminent orchestrated attack that is of sufficient scale as to elevate the attack to one against the state and not only against individuals within it. To blithely accept that the UK has the right to defend itself against Reyaad Khan is to grossly exaggerate the threat one individual can pose, but it also represents a reversion to a very primitive view of the state whereby its promise to protect its citizens at all costs is used to circumvent the basic rights of individuals. Moreover, the portrayal of individuals like Khan as dangerous and evil serves the purpose of justifying their demise. Precise and clinical summary execution of individuals suspected of terrorist activities in a country far away from the UK is technologically possible but it clearly violates human rights standards. It is time, however, that human rights laws caught up with technology.
